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Constitutional Law-Civil RightsState Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Ds, the Governor of Ohio and other officials, proposed to enter
into construction contracts for a public educational facility. Ps, two
Negroes who had made repeated unsuccessful attempts to gain
membership in certain labor unions, brought a class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Ds, alleging that qualified
Negroes would be unable to get jobs because the contractors would
use only union hiring sources and some union officials prevented
Negroes from obtaining union membership. Held, injunction granted.
Ds' proposed action would be a deprivation of Ps' privileges and
immunities under color of state law. The state is not allowed to
avoid responsibilities under the fourteenth amendment by ignoring
or failing to perform them. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83
(S.D. Ohio 1967).
The pivotal issue in the principal case was whether Ds' conduct
amounted to state action within the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment.' Federal courts have long held that the fourteenth
amendment applies only to state action and not to individual action.'
In the Ethridge case individual actions (union discrimination practices) were primarily responsible for the harm complained of by
plaintiffs. The court logically held, however, that the state's dealings
with the union (through the construction firms) amounted to participation in the discrimination. This in itself was enough to
constitute "state action." 3
One of the first cases to define "state action" was Ex parte
Virginia.4 In this case the Supreme Court sustained an indictment
against a state officer for excluding Negroes from a jury list. Holding
that the action by the state officer was state action, the Court said:'
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. The applicable part of this section reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); But see United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966). For a comment on the state action concept in the area of
individual actions, see 66 W. Va. L. Rev. 325 (1964).
3 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
4 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
1

sId. at 347.
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Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due
process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of
the laws, violates the Constitutional inhibition; and as he acts
in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's
power, his act is that of the State.
Two other cases previous to Ex parte Virginia revolved around
the same central theme. The Supreme Court struck down a West
Virginia statute which denied Negroes the right to serve as jurors in
Strauderv. West Virginia.' In Virginia v. Rives' the question of state
action was raised where a judge overruled a motion to modify an all
white jury to include one third Negroes in a murder trial of two
Negroes.'
The principle established by these and other decisions is that the
fourteenth amendment governs all action of a state whether through
its executive or administrative officers, legislature, or courts." The
question of state action has arisen over the years in a number of
cases,"0 the Court applying the above principle to the facts of each
case." It must be remembered, however, that not all the acts of state
officers are acts of the state. They must act under state authority
or "color of state authority,"' 2 or under "color or pretense '"3 of law
4
before such acts constitute state action.
6100 U.S. 303 (1879).
7100
U.S. 313 (1879).
8 Id. The Court defined state action, but determined
that there was
none here.
9 Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
"See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (court permitting
damage judgments for breach of racially restrictive covenants); Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (court enforcing racially restrictive covenants);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (same); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (city manager requiring license to distribute literature);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecuting attorney contriving
to procure conviction and imprisonment of individual); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927) (statute prohibiting Negro participation in primary
elections); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913) (city ordinance establishing telephone rates).
" For discussions of the historical development of the state action
concept, see Barnett, What Is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L. REv. 227

(1945);Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition

14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
CoLm. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Van Astyne and Karst, State Action, 14
STANFORD L. REv. 3 (1961).
12 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 246 (1931).
'3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
'4 "Color" would include those acts which are done under a semblance
of
authority, as opposed to those done under actual authority. BLAcK's LAw
DicTioNARY 331 (4th ed. 1951).
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A plaintiff injured as a result of state action may obtain relief
through federal statutes such as those relied on in the principal
case.'5 The court held that the plaintiffs correctly asserted jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),6 which had been defined and
applied previously in the landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape.7
Under this section any public officer who violates the constitutional
rights of a citizen may have an action or suit brought against him.
Plaintiffs in Ethridge case, having established state action on the part
of the defendants, were enabled to seek and obtain injunctive relief.
Even though plaintiffs had established jurisdiction in the federal
courts, the more important issue arose as to whether intervention
by the federal court was premature. Federal'" and state 9 statutes
distinctly spell out the procedure under which plaintiffs would have
obtained redress in this situation, i.e., racial discrimination. Under
the federal statute monetary damages arising out of discriminatory
work practices equal to the amount of back pay dating to the time
of discrimination may be awarded. Plaintiffs were obligated to prove
that the injury to them warranted the extraordinary relief of an
injunction by a federal district court rather than just monetary
damages." The court here reasoned that injunctive relief was
warranted since such discrimination tends to have an adverse psychological effect on the class discriminated against which cannot be
remedied by the payment of money." This identical argument was
made by the Supreme Court in the now famous decision of Brown
v. Board of Education.2
1'28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (3), 2201 (1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(1964).
1642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. (Emphasis added.)
17 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
See also Sigue v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp.,
235 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. La. 1964); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 153
F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Oppenheimer v. Stillwell, 132 F. Supp.
761 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
1842 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
, 9 0ro REV. CODE, ch. 4112 (1964). For the applicable West Virginia
statute
20 see W. VA. CODE ch. 5, art. 11, §§ 1-15 (Michie Supp. 1967).
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967); accord,
Local 499, IBEW v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Iowa
1964).
21 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83,88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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At this point it is important to note that the same statute which
would award back pay also admits the complaining party into the
union which is guilty of discrimination thereby giving him complete
relief. Plaintiffs in the principal case could have obtained relief
through the state and federal administrative procedure. Federal
courts have long held that they cannot interfere in such matters until
all administrative procedures are exhausted.2 3 Although this rule
has been modified to some extent,2" general speaking it is still the
law."5 However, it must be remembered that the principal case
involves a class action instead of an individual action, and the rule
would not necessarily be binding by analogy. Furthermore, the relief
sought must be considered. Plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin defendants from participating with discriminatory unions and in no
way asked for back pay or admission to a union. The above issues
will be important if the decision is appealed, for it is upon these
issues that the plaintiffs' right to federal court relief rests.
In the principal case Negroes as a class were successful in attacking
union discrimination indirectly through state officers dealing with
the union. The decision has a twofold effect: (1) It forces the state
of Ohio to take notice of racial discrimination in labor unions, and
(2) it forces the labor unions to reconsider past decisions concerning
the continued practice of such discrimination. This case does
raise the problem of federal intervention in state affairs: it limits
those parties with which a state may contract, perhaps an undue
restriction on the freedom of parties to contract with whomever they
choose. However, the court balanced this freedom of contract
against the rights of individuals as guaranteed by the Constitution
and again upheld those rights. This decision may well be followed
in the future as it represents a speedy and effective means by which
Negroes and other groups as a class may secure recognition of their
civil rights. It also represents one of the largest extensions of the
state action concept since its inception. When any action interferes
23 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Hegeman
Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934); United States v. Illinois
Central R.R. 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521
(1932); Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959); Holt v. Raleigh
City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Warlick, 238
F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956); Carson v. Bd. of Educ., 227 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.

1955).

Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
For a discussion on the problem of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAw §§ 20.01-20.10 (1959).
24

25
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with the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, and especially
action in some manner sanctioned or authorized by a state, other
extensions may arguably be warranted.
John CharlesLobert

Damages-Vehicle-Recovery of More Than Actual Physical
Damage When the Vehicle is Partially Destroyed
D negligently damaged the taxicab of P. The cost to repair the
taxicab was $1,349 while the difference in market value before
and after the collision was $415. P claims that under the special
circumstances of a city ordinance he is not permitted to buy a used
car and convert it to a taxicab. P, therefore, contends he must have
the cost of repair to make him whole. The lower court held he was
entitled only to the difference in fair market values. Held, affirmed.
The general rule for damages to personal property partially destroyed
is that the difference in fair market values before and after the
accident is the proper element of recovery where such is less than the
cost of repair. Here P failed to show the necessary special circumstances which would have made this general rule inapplicable, i.e., P
failed to show that he could not buy a used taxicab which would
satisfy the city ordinance. In the absence of such a showing he was
completely compensated by recovering the difference in fair market
values. Norview Cars Incorporated v. Crews, 156 S.E.2d 603 (Va.
1967).
The rule of damages in the principal case is a widely accepted one
used in many jurisdictions.' It focuses on the actual physical damage
inflicted. However, it is but one of several elements of recovery
available to the injured party who might also be able to obtain
recovery for loss of use or rental value, loss of profits, removal and
storage, and interest.
The puropse of compensatory damages is to compensate the person
wholly for the losses sustained concurrent with the least burden to
the wrongdoer. In cases of personal property where there has been
total destruction, this objective is achieved by awarding the fair
market value, at the time of the accident, of the item destroyed less
any salvage value. Where there has been partial destruction, the
'22 Am.

JuR.

2d Damages § 145 (1965).
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